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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

NELDA CRAWFORD and DAVID BEES-

LEY, dba BEESLEY MONUMENT &
VAULT COMPANY,

Plaintiffs-Respondent,
VS.

CITY OF MANTI, a Municipal Corpora-

NO. 10,392

tion, Frank J. Garbe, its Mayor, Margaret

Anderson, Ben Kjar, Lloyd R. Nielsen,
Ray P. Cox and R. Morgan IDyreng, its
City Council, and Clarence Robert Hall,
its Sexton,
Defendants--Appellants.

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action for a Declaratory Judgment in which
Nelda Crawford seeks to complete a memorial pattern of
monuments existing in the Manti City Cemetery on cemelery lots owned by her, by establishing pillow type monu-

2

ments identical with those in the pattern at the h
:
ead ct
her deceased husband's grave, as well as the right to have
an identical one placed at the head of her grave upon h
.
er
dermse, despite the provisions of an Amended Manti City
Ordinance requiring that all monuments established afte;.
its adoption must be flush with the surface of the ground
The trial rourt held that the Amended Ordinance was un.
reasonable insofar as it prevented the completion of the
Crawford Memorial Pattern, and enjoined its enforcement
against the cemetery lots. Defendants appealed from that
judgment to this court.

Il

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

With ·the exceptions hereinafter noted we believe that
.
appellants' staitement of facts fairly reflects the record before this rourt on this appeal. The exceptions are as fd·
lows:
We would mcxllfy statement No 4 on page 5 of ap~I·
lants' brief to show that the memorial pattern consisted of
the three pillow type monuments, and the large monument
which was located at the west end of lots. The com·
plaint alleged, the answer admitted and <the court founa.
that the Crawford family had arranged and established the
memorial pattern in the Crawford lots prior to 1915 ana
there is no evidence in the record to the contrary (R. J.)

f

I

1

I

I

8-9).

We would supplement paragraph 5 of appellants' statement pertaining to the Edmund Crawford pilloW ~ m~:
ument and the refusal to allow its installation by the e1cy
sexton, by setting forth testimony with respect thereto I

g;.,... at the trial by Beesley as follows:

I
i
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Our workmen went down there and erected
the monument and it was removed. And I went down
and checked on it and found the sexton had removed
the base part. We hadn't at that time put the top part
on." (Tr. 9).
'' l A)

Beesley's testimony is that the sexton had removed
the "base part" and this is the only evidence in the record
concerning the removal. The court found that the sexton
had "torn" the monument out and we believe Beesley's
testimony supports it because it is difficult to see how the
monument base could have been removed without being
tom out.

Referring to the last paragraph of Statement No. 5
on page 6 of appellants' brief, we challenge the statement
that "since October, 1948, there had been many similar requests by persons whose lots were in exactly the same condition as the Crawford lots." The witness, Hall, testified
at length that after the amendment of the ordinance in
question there had been many requests identical with that
made by the plaintiff in this case and he listed on defendants' Exihibit 8 some eighteen claimed identical cases. On
cross examination this witness was obliged to admit that
there were only "Four. Four that I can recall." (Tr. 47).
There is no evidence in this record CYf an identical case with
lhe Crawford case because none CYf those mentioned by
Hall claimed a "Memorial Monument Pattern" established
long before the amendment in question was adopted by
Manti City and whieh was sought to be continued and
brought to a conclusion after the amendment was adopted.
Emphasis supplied).
AµPf>llants summarize the testimony of the witnesses,
1

4

HWl and Nielsen, apparently for the purpose of showino
the contents of the record respecting the reasons why Man~
City adopted the aemndment in question on October 25
1948 (App. Br. 7-10). These witnesses gave as the reasoi~
why the amendment should be adopted, (1) "to savt
money for Manti", (2) "convenience for those who cared
for the cemetery", (Tr. 42-43) and (3) "for esthetic considerations" (Tr. 52). As part of his cross-examination
the witness Hall said:
"Q. And the considerations that you had were
purely from the point of view of the financial interests
of the city and the convenience of the caretakers?
A. That is right." (Tr. 43).
"Q. You didn't consider the sentiment.al feelings
of people who had established such monuments in the
center of the block did you?
A. Yes sir."
"Q. Well, at any rate you let the financial con·
siderations pver-rule the feelings of the people?
A. No. That was not the idea."
"Q. Well, you did that.
A. Well-"
"Q. Didn't you?
A. To that extent; yes." (Tr. 42).

On cross-examination Hall testified as to the esthetic
reasons given by him as follows:

"Q You did not want to say, did you, that to al·
· ter·
low a •pattern established over the years to (be ) m
'th
rupted about in its middle would be in accordance WI
esthetics, do you?
.
tak·
couldn't
see
that
it
was
addmg
or
,
ell
I
A. W '
that wa•
ing away from the beauty of the stones
there. . . "

5
·'Q. Norw I show you Exhibit No. 1. Tua tshows
the three stones. They look pretty good?
A. Yes."
"But you can see by looking at it that it is an esthetic blunder, can't you, to disallow the other graves
to have the same kind of markers?
A. Well, I won't say that it is a blunder." (Tr.
54).

Although the reasons given for the adoption of the
amendment by Manti City are of questionable relevance
to the principal issue presented on 1hls appeal, we refer to
the record in order to show that they are specifically inapplicable to the Crawford cemetery lots. The witness,
Hall, testified that Crawfords have always paid their perpetual care and have maintained same ever since it began
ln the Manti City Cemetery in 1936 (Tr. 55). Beesley testified (Tr. 10) "A. By putting a coping, a cement coping
around the level with the grass out say seven to nine inches
around each of the markers would give ample room for
the lawn mower to cut the grass, and with the cement border around there would beautify and I think would improve
the looks of the whole area."
11he witness, Hall, admitted on cross-examination (Tr.
50) that Beesley's suggestion could eliminate any interference with cutting the lawns around the monument. Also
Hall testified that the reason given for the pa$8.ge of the
amendment in order to keep the hoses from getting caught
on the monuments has largely been eliminated since the
sprinkler systems were installed at the cemetery (Tr. 42).
We shall hereinafter refer to Nelda Crawford as ~

, SJJondent.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT IS IN PART SEMAN.
TIC; DOES NOT FULLY SET FORTH THE LAW; AND
ERRONEOUSLY ATTRIBUTES AS "JUDICIAL LEGISLATION", THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION PROPERLY EXERCISEID BY THE TRIAL COURT.
We desire to comment briefly on the points made !n
appellants' argument.
Point I is largely a question of semantics, appellants
claiming that the words "tore out the installation" as found
by the court, is not supported by the testimony of Beesley
that the "sexton had removed the base part". It is diffi.
cult to see how the base part of the monwnent could be
removed without it being torn out, and consequently we
think the finding is supported. However, the es.5€111tial facts
in this regard are admitted, i.e., that the monument plain·
tiff had installed was removed and defendants refused to
allow it to be constructed because of the amended ordi·

nance.
Point 2 (A) and (B) do present the essrotial question
of law presented on this appeal which we shall answer in

our argument.

3
Apparently appellants felt no need of arguing Point ·

Point 4 is not a fair and full statement of the law ap. b use it Jacks
plicable in the situation set forth hereln, eca
the concluding part of the rule referred to, namely ~al
• pplica·
cemetery regulations must be reasonable in their5.:.-tion.

(Emphasis supplied).

l
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Point 5 embodies an untenable argument because the
trial court did not over-rule the action of the City Council,
bu it f otmd, concluded, and held that an amendment to
an ordinance passed by the City Council was not applicable to the respondents' cemetery lots because it unreasonably denied an existing right of respondent.
The principal question presented by this appeal involves the validity of the amended ordinance in question
and the issues in this connection are two-fold:
(1)

Does the amended ordinance in question impair

the property rights of the respondent by interrupting the
long established monument pattern in the cemetery lots
in question Wld.er the guise of regulation? and,

Is the amended ordinance arbitrary, Wll"e8SQ!l·
able or capricious as a regulation of respondent's cemetery
lots in which a monument pattern had long prior thereto
been established?
(2)

Appellants seem to have correctly understood plaintiffs' theory of the case as indicated at the top of page 12
of their brief, but our argument is not reflected by what
is there said. The argument is, that the Crawford family
established monuments in its cemetery lots forming a memorial pattern which was 4/6ths complete in 1915, and
its completion required only the addition of the remaining
2/6ths of same. This was admitted by the evidence, was
found by the court and became the basis of the judgment.
While the monuments large and small themselves oonsistetl of individual stones, yet the memorial pattern which
they constituted became and remain an entity in and of
itself even though unfinished. When respondent acquired
the cemetery lots she succeeded to the rights which had

•
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vested in the memorial pattern, nearly completed, but then
unfinished. Appellants must agree with us that the amen.
ded ordinance in question oould not require respondent to
remove any of the monuments which constituted the pa\.
tern in question for the reason that they stood above the
surface of the ground. That being true neither could the
amended ordinance strike down the memorial pattern made
up of the monuments. The trial court adopted respond.
ent's theory and rightly found and determined that the
amended ordinance could not reasonably prevent the com.
pletion of the monument pattern. Appellants' reference
to seven "good men and true" has no relevance to what
the eourt found under the evidence in this case. The rec·
ord does not sustain appellants' statement that "there were
18 additional plots in exactly the same state as the Craw·
ford lots with respect to monuments and markers installed
and in contemplation". The fact is that nowhere in this
record is there any evidence of a situation identical with
the Crawford lots in that in no other situation was there
any evidence of the establishment of a "monument memorial pattern" which was pursued and in existence long
before the amended ordinance in question was adopted.
POINT II
THE AMENDED ORDINANCE IN QUESTION:

IMPAIRS THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF RE·
SPONDENT BY INTERRUPTING A LONG ESTABLISHED MONUMENT PATI'ERN IN THE CEMETERY
LOTS IN QUESTION UNDER THE GiUISE OF REGU·
(a)

LATION, AND
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(b) TifE AMENDED ORDINANCE IS
TRARY, UNREASONABLE AND CAPRICIOUS
REGULATION OF RESPONDENT'S CEMETERY
IN \VHICH A MONUMENT PATTERN HAD
LONG ESTABLISHED.

ARBIAS A
LOTS
BEEN

The Findngs, Conclusions and Judgment of the Trial
Court are preponderantly supported by the evidence in this
case, and same should be affirmed by this court because
same are in accordance with law.

There is no question but that Manti City has the
powe rconferred on it by statute as a City of ,the third class
to purchase, operate, and make rules for its cemetery. Section 10-8-62, U.C.A. 1953. This we admitted at the trial
and at no time have be contended otherwise.
'I'he general rule of law applicable to the instant case
ls stated in 14 CJS Seeton 3, p. 66, as follows:
"When expressly so authorized, a municipality may own
and maintain cemeteries. It may exercise general control over a cemetery owned by it, but must not exercise and control t in an arbitrary, unreasonaible, or
capricious manner."
It is our position that the amended ordinance (1) unreasonably attempts to put an end to the monument pattern in the Crawfod lots, and (2) that the ordinance in
making such attempt would destroy the vested right of
respondent in the memorial pattern and would be void and
of no effect.

A leading case supporing the foregoing general rule
and particularly that portion of same which requires the
exercise of the city's control and regulation of cemeteries

10
be reasonably, is Mansker v. City O•f Astoria' 100 o r. 4<
u5,
198 Pac. 199. The cemetery in that case consis+""1
f
u::u o an

old sectiorn not subject to perpetual maintenance and a new
section which was being subjected to perpetual mainttnance under a regulation known as the endowment plan
adopted by the Cemetery Commission. When an attempt
was made to apply this regulation to rspondent's lot In the
old cemetery it was resisted and this lawsuit resulted. Th~
question arose in the case as to whether or not the city
could force the orwner orf the old cemetery lot purchased
a long time before the adoption of the new endowment plan
to pay an assessment in the amount of $77.45 made by thP
Cemetery Commission against the old cemetery lot owners
along with the owners of lots in the new cemetery and at
the same rate. The court discussed the reasonableness of
the regulation as it applied to the lot ol\VJlers in the new
secton of the cemetery and held that the regulation was
reasonable as it affected the owners in the new cemetery,
then said "but quite a different question is presented when
we come to consider the authority of the Commission to
apply the endowmnt plan to lots which were sold before
the endowment plan was adopted." At page 204 of 198
Pac. the court further staed that:
"The concrete question for decision is: Can the Com·
mission by compulsion bring within the embrace of the
endowment plan all lots which were sold prior to the
adoption of the plan?"
This court considers the nature of the conveyance by~
·1 even
city of a cemetery lot, and also the power ofthe ci y, ·
. ht'
by rthe exercise of its "police power" to abrogate rig "
rior tu
which have vested by reason of such conveyances P
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the regulatory measure. Appellants in their brief argue that
the conveyance to Crawford carried with it only the right
of burial and was subject to any changes the city might
thereafter make, and also that the city had a right under
ils "police power" to interfere with rights which accrued
to Crawfords before the amended ordinance in question
was adopted. The Oregon court in the Mansker case, Supra,
has resolved these questions against appellants' contentions
and we quote its language from pages 205-6 of the Pacific

Reporter:

"A conveyance of a cemetery lot as a place of burial
for the dead does not vest :the grantee with fee-simple

title in the lot ,but gives rights analogous to an easement or a privilege; the rght of burial being a privilege or license to be enjoyed so long as the place continues to be a burial ground subject to municipal regulation and coru-ol and legally revoka:ble whenever the
public interest requires."

"The privilege or license created by the conveyance, in
the absence of express restrictons made at the time,
include more than the mere naked right of depositing
a dead body in the ground; for with the right of interment are included :the right to do so according to
the usual custom in the neighborhood, the right to
make mounds, and the right to erect stones and monuments at the graves. A cemetery is not only a place
where the living may bury their dead, but it is also a
place where they may express their affection and respect for those dead by marking and decorating the
place of interment."
"The circumstances are not such as to make the attempted action of the cemetery commission a lawful
exercise of the police power, broad though the scope
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of the police power is. Nor can the city say that th
right to compel the application of the endowmen~
plan was reserved to the dty at the time of the con.
veyance of the lot to the plaintiff. The city is with.
out power to bring the plaintiff's lot within the em.
brace of the endowment plan, unless the plaintiff con.
sents."
"The court on appeal affirmed the decision of the low.
er court in favor of plaintiff and enjoined perma.
nently the enforcement of the ordinance."
The principle of the Mansker case was applied in a
recent Oregon case, Shaefer v. West Lawn Memorial Cem·
etery (1960) 222 Or. 241, 352 Pac 2d 744, where it was
held that the regulation requiring monwnents to be flush
with the surface of the ground was reasonable as to the
new section of the cemetery in question but not as to the
old section.
At this point we call attention to the Manti City Or·
dinances, Sections 180 and 181 of the compilation of 1941.
Before the amendment in question the oJd part of the cem·
etery, including the part in which the Crawford lots are
located, was not subjected to the regulation requiring mon·
uments to be flush with the surface of the ground, but the
new section was. It was not until the amendment of Oc·
tober 25, 1948, was adopted that an attempt was made to
apply this regulation to the old part of the cemetery where
there existed monuments that were not flush with the
surface of the ground and which rose above it. In so doing Manti City has attempted to abrogate the vested rights
of respondent in the said memorial pattm, which had long
existed in the old cemetery, and the trial court so held ,.

!

I
I

I

I
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and its dedsion is supported nort O'llly by the facts but by
he Jaw which we have hereinabove discussed.
The above mentioned rule of reasonableness was applied to attempted regulations by municipalities and the
attempted regulatory measures were struck down because
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and we cite a few
of the cases as follows:

Chariton Cemetery Company v. Charlton Granite
Works, 197 Iowa 403, 197 NW 457, 32 ALR 1401.
(Rule providing that the work of improving lots and
the construction foundations for monuments, should
be done only by employees of the company declared
unreasonable and void) .

Rect.or . . . St. Paul's Church, Milwaukee v. Black-

burn (Wis. 1939), 230 Wis. 570, 284 NW 491

(Lot

purchased without perpetual care-later attempt to

subject lot to perpetual care held not an exereise of

police power and ordinance struck down.)

Scott v. Lakewood Cemet.ery Assoc. (Minn. 1926) 167
Minn. 223, 208 NW 811 (Rules excluding florists without superintendent permission from cemetery, and
providing cemetery association exclusively should
thatch graves at specified presses, held unreasonable
and void as to lot purchased prior to adoption of
rules).

Ignatowski v. St Mary's Polish Catholic Cemetery Co.
et a.I. (1953 Pa.) 174 Pa. Super. 62, 98 Alantic 2d 234.
(Regulation requiring interment in concrete vault p~
vided by cemetery held unreasonable and void) .
Steele v. Rosehill Cemetery Co. (Ill. 1938) 370 Ill. 405,
19 NE 2d 189 (held unreasonable to att:m.pt change
by rule of cemetery vested rights in cemetery lots purchased prior to amendment raising the price of perpetual care) .

14
Sliver v. Greenmount Cemetery Co. (Pa. 1949) 16 Pa
4
~uper 534, 67 Atlantic 2d 584 (Unreasonable to sub.
Ject cemetery lot to perpetual care by ordinance adop.
ted subsequent to purchase of the lot).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is our position that the respondent has a ves~
right to have the pattern of monwnents established and
carride out prior to the adoption of the Manti Ordinances
of 1941 and the amendment thereto made in 1948, con·
tinued and completed so that a like pillow type monument
could be placed at the head of her deceased husband's
grave, and provision for an identical monument to be placed
at the head of her burial place beside that of her hus·
band. We believe that the law above referred to sustains
the :respondent's right in the premises, and that the amen·
ded ordinance in its attempt to abrogate same is unrea·
sonable in that it would deprive respondent of long established vested rights in the premises. The Findings, Con·
clusions and Judgment holding plaintiff entitled to these
rights made by the Trial Court is amply sustained by the
evidence and are in accordance with the law and should
be affirmed.

GEORGE S. BALLIF
For BALLIF & BALLIF
Attorneys for Respondent
84 East 100 South
Provo, Utah

